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450 South State Street 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Re: Copeland v. Moyle, Consolidated Appeal No. 980239-CA 
Citation of Supplemental Authority, Rule 24(j), U.R.App.P. 
Dear Clerk of the Court, 
The plaintiffs-appellees in the above referenced appeal, pursuant to Rule 
24(j), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, hereby submits an original and seven (7) 
copies of the following citation of supplemental authority. 
Promax Development Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247 (Utah App. 1997). 
This case was recently discovered by plaintiffs' counsel in the course of 
research regarding an unrelated issue in another case. 
This issue was discussed in the parties' briefs in the following locations: 
Defendant's Initial Brief: Point I (pp. 13-18); Point II (pp. 18-21); Point III 
(pp. 21-23) 
Plaintiffs' Response: Point IV (A)&(B), (pp. 8-16) 
Defendant's Reply: Point II (pp. 11-13) 
Copeland v. Moyle, Consolidated Appeal No. 980239-CA 
Citation of Supplemental Authority, Rule 240), U.R.App.P. 
Page 2 
Reasons For the Supplemental Citation: 
The primary issue on appeal is an award of damages to the plaintiffs based 
on a "benefit of the bargain" theory from a failed real estate transaction. Plaintiffs 
provided valuation testimony from Randy Day, who was the defendant's real estate 
broker/agent and had personal knowledge of the Moab market as well as this 
particular property, but who was not a licensed appraiser. Defendant argued that 
the Court improperly considered Mr. Day's opinion on valuation. 
An issue in Mattson was essentially the same as this case, i.e., the market 
value of a property as an element in determining damages for a failed sale. In 
Mattson, as here, no testimony was received from a licensed real estate appraiser. 
Rather, the Court's ruling as to fair market value of the property was based on 
estimates from the owner of the home and its builder. This Court held: 
While the testimony (of the builder) was not precise, it was sufficient, 
coupled with (the owner's) testimony, to support the trial court's ruling. Id, 943 
P.2d at 257. 
Further, the trial court was free to find (the owner's) testimony credible. Id., 
at 258. 
End of citations of supplemental authority. 
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This is to certify that on the [^ day of M/f^j , 2000, an original and seven (7) 
copies of the foregoing Citation of Supplemental Authority were mailed, postage prepaid, to 
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BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
JURISDICTION 
Plaintiffs concur with the statement of jurisdiction. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
For purposes of this appeal, plaintiffs agree with and will respond to each of the issues 
presented by defendant. Plaintiffs concur with the standards of appellate review set forth for the 
issues presented. 
DETRMINA TIVE STA TUTES 
Plaintiffs deny that the "Real Estate Appraiser Registration and Certification Act/5 
U.C.A. §61-2b-l, et seq., is determinative of any issue in this appeal. Plaintiffs are aware of no 
issues that would be considered determinative in this case. 
STA TEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs concur with defendant's statement of the: A. The Nature of the Case; and B. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
C. Statement of Facts. (Defendant's facts are not in numbered paragraphs.) 
(i) Comments on Defendant's Facts 
1. In the first paragraph, defendant states that, 'The listing agent was Randy 
Day, a salesman with Canyon Country Realty." Actually Randy Day had been the Broker for 
Canyon Country Realty for 9 years, and had been a real estate agent for 15 years. R 251 
(Transcript of July 13, 1998 hearing), at 23,39. 
2. In paragraph 7, defendant states that the District Court ruled that 
defendant's sale of the B&B to the plaintiffs "did not include the business." This 
mischaracterizes the Court's statement which was as follows: 
Court: Let me tell you what I interpret from the contract. If that's all I have is the 
contract, the real estate is included, these prepayment(s), these prepaid nightly rentals, obviously 
that's fair because they are going to have to provide a room for these people who have prepaid, 
the guest book, and the right to use the name because the name is stated Canyon Country Bed 
and Breakfast is stated right there on the agreement, but not anything else. R 251 at 35, 
The Court did not say that the sale did not include the business. From the list it is quite 
obvious that the sale of a continuing business was contemplated. As will be discussed in the 
brief, plaintiffs contend that the forgoing list of items found by the Court to be included in the 
sale does constitute the business. 
1 
(ii) Additional Facts 
1. At all relevant times herein the defendant Nelson Moyle was a licensed 
real estate agent. R 251 at 51-52. 
2. In accepting the Copelands' purchase offer, defendant attempted to cut 
himself in on the commission by listing himself as an additional listing agent for the transaction. 
R. 10A. (See, copies of the Real Estate Purchase Contract in defendant's Appendix "C" & "E") 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. The claims of the Coldwell Banker and Canyon Country Realty are, in a sense, 
derivative to that of the Copelands. That is, if there was a valid contract, the real estate agents 
are entitled to their commission as a matter of law. The District Court's award of costs and 
attorneys' fees to these plaintiffs was specifically provided for in the listing agreement signed by 
the defendant. R. 107B. (See, copies of the Listing Agreement in defendant's Appendix "C" & 
"E") 
2. The contract case is extremely simply. When defendant, himself a licensed real 
estate agent, checked acceptance on the Real Estate Purchase Contract, rather than 
counteroffer, a valid and binding contract was formed. R 14A. The District Court's finding 
that insignificant items of personal property excepted by the defendant did not constitute a 
counteroffer since the Copelands had not offered to buy them was correct. R. 191 A. 
3. The Copelands' measure of damages was "benefit of the bargain." The 
Copelands' expert witness Randy Day was very well qualified to provide an opinion regarding 
the fair market value of the subject property at the time of sale and did so. The District Court 
had ample discretion to admit the testimony under Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence and its 
admission was not an abuse of discretion. 
Since the defendant offered no competent evidence regarding the value of the property, 
the Court's factual finding in that regard was not against the clear weight of the evidence or 
clearly erroneous. 
4. The Court reduced the value of the property by $15,000 (from $250,000 to 
$235,000) based upon the Copelands' concession that they did not intend to purchase the phone 
line. The Copelands provided no evidence regarding the value of the phone line because they did 
not need it and did not offer to buy it. The defendant testified dubiously that the phone line was 
the most important asset of the B&B. Based on this evidence the Court's reduction in the value 
of the property was not clearly erroneous. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Copelands' Offer Was Accepted Creating a Binding Contract. 
Defendant's Acceptance Did Not Constitute a Counteroffer. 
In Point IV of his brief, defendant contends that his acceptance of the Copelands' offer to 
purchase the B&B was really a counteroffer and that therefore no binding contract was created. 
The sole basis for defendant's claim is that he interlineated a few items of personal property to 
be excepted from the sale. The argument is without merit. 
Keep in mind the fact that defendant was not a novice engaged in his first real estate 
transaction. He was, at all relevant times, a licensed professional real estate agent intimately 
familiar with the requirements and documents for real estate sales. Hearing Transcript, R. 251 
at 51-52. As is generally the case, the real estate listing papers were quite specific about what 
was included with the property. See, Real Estate Purchase Contract at R. 9A. 
The Copelands submitted a written purchase offer detailing what they were offering to 
purchase. Note that the Purchase Offer specifically states, "Bed & Breakfast at 590 North 500 
West, Moab." Id Defendant accepted the offer. He specifically checked Acceptance on the 
Real Estate sales Contract, where there was an option to chepk Counteroffer. R-14A. That the 
defendant excepted a few items of personal property is of no consequence. See testimony at R. 
251 at 50-52, The Copelands had not offered to purchase those items and had no expectation of 
acquiring them. (Affidavit of George Copeland, R-183-84A) 
Buyers look at furnished homes on the market aware from the listing documents of what 
is included in the sale. If the buyer makes an offer, it is not necessary for the seller to exclude 
personal property like things hanging on the wall because they were never part of the transaction, 
and doing so does not make an accepted offer\ as existed in this case, a counteroffer. 
The District Court could see this quite clearly and correctly ruled that defendant's 
reservations of items of property that the Copelands had not offered to buy, did not constitute 
counteroffer. In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law granting the Copelands' Motion for 
Summary Judgment on the breach of contract issue (R. 191A) the Court found: 
4. In accepting the offer, the defendant added the following language to Section 1.2 
(Excluded Items) on the Real Estate Purchase Contract: 
"All skis, water & snow, bikes, kayaks and other personal sports equipment not included." 
5. The Court finds that language to be superfluous and of no impact to the accepted 
offer since the Buyers had not offered to purchase the excepted items. (This Finding applies 
even if, as defendant alleged, some or all of the equipment had been used for rental by customers 
of defendant's bed & breakfast.) 
(Defendant' Appendix "C"); See also, Affidavit of Randy Day (Defendant's Listing Agent), R 
185-86A, and separate Affidavit of Randy Day in the Real Estate Commission case, R. 44-46B. 
The contention that defendant really intended his acceptance to be a counteroffer is 
further negated by the fact that he also tried to pencil himself in for some of the commission on 
the sale. On page 2 of the sales contract (R 10A), he wrote himself in as an additional Listing 
Agent. See, District Court's Findings in this regard at R. 19?A. 
This Court should affirm the District Court's ruling that defendant's acceptance of the 
Copelands' purchase offer created a valid and binding contract. 
II. The Real Estate Commission Was Earned and Judgment in 
Favor of Those Plaintiffs Should Be Affirmed. 
Should this Court find that defendant's acceptance of the Copelands' offer created a valid 
real estate purchase contract, the issue of the real estate agents' commission is resolved and the 
Judgment in favor of Coldwell Banker/Arches Realty and Canyon Country Realty should also be 
affirmed. The Listing Agreement between defendant and canyon Country Realty provides for a 
6% commission, 
If, during the Listing Period, the Company . . . locates a party who is ready, willing and able to 
buy . . . the Property . . . at the listing price . . ,orat any other price and terms to which the 
Seller may agree in writing... R. 5-8B (emphasis added) 
According to defendant's real estate agent Randy Day, Day spoke to defendant on the 
phone immediately after receiving the Copelands' offer, as follows: 
Day: We have received a written purchase offer on the bed & breakfast. 
Moyle: How much is the offer? 
Day: $185,000. 
Moyle: Great. I can do that. Fax it to me. 
See, that testimony and other details regarding defendant's acceptance of the purchase 
offer in the Affidavit of Randy Day. R. 44-46B. 
Nothing more is needed to affirm.,, the District. Court's award oi umrnarv Tndoment to the 
HI dl i Xtk agenl (tli.ttttfi, II Iiiilfiih f.I of 1.1 i MMI „, r,,u,il M 6% of the $185,000 selling 
price. Paragraph X of the Listing Agreement provides for the recovery of attorneys' fees and 
costs, Sec Judgmental III, 111 J. II * II .mini < Nik i d\\\)\t\\ mi).! <|vuifl mi co'.ls ami Jlilomo " In • ,\\ 
R. 126-27B. (Defendant's Appendix "D" & "G" respectively.) 
Ill I here W as "N o "Business" Involved. In I lie Subject 
I ransaction Separate and. Apart From The Property Itself 
it i$ cieax ii^i ucici.u^i. was selling his pionem ;r> a B&B. and that the CopeunJs 
intended tp bnv rmA, operate the property ac a ;K\JJ . :^ propertv was specilicair 
' * • — • . ' • vi Randy Day, R. 251 at 50-52. See also, \tfida* < *\ 
Joe Kingsley, R, 110-112A 'K Copelands made their intent perfectly clear by naiudih* in 
defendani. Defendant attempts to persuade this Court that he had a business that had Hie 
separate and upii irom the property i te aia not. 
According to the testimony of plaintillV valuation witness, Randy Day, the property was 
a "ti urn-key operation../' R, 251 at 50-52. The property was specifically advertised and promoted 
as a Ti i.i i i ke> bed, ai id breakfas t" 'w ith defendai it's knowledge, input and consent. M at 25-29, 
50-5.2. I he transaction included everything the Copelands needed for a B&B, The property' 
w;is \\KX flit;j|lll,) Irsij'in'il \v ;n « nmnutdalt1 ^ ,u I ' , JIH ',' i I "••! l\u "' o(K I.I.HK 
obtained the B&B name, Canyon Country Bed & Breakfast, all necessan furnishings, the guest 
book and prepaid deposits, if any. Id. at y- v (Ruling lefendant's 
breach, of the contract, all the Copelands had to do "to be in business" was open the doors and do 
a little advertising. 
Thus, defendant's contention that the Copelands' purchase offer included "only the 
property and not the business" is incorrect. The Court understood from the evidence that there 
was no business separate and distinct from the property. For all intents and purposes, for a bed 
and breakfast, the property is the business. 
IV. The Testimony of Randy Day Was Competent, Reliable and an 
Adequate Basis For the Court's Ruling 
Having ruled that defendant's acceptance of the Copelands' offer created a valid contract, 
it was left to the District Court to determine the issue of damages flowing from defendant's 
breach of the contract. The Copelands presented various theories of recovery, but eventually 
settled upon and limited themselves to the "benefit of the bargain" theory. Under benefit of the 
bargain, the Copelands are entitled to recover the difference between the market value of the 
property as of the date of the sale (the closing date was to be April 1, 1997), and the purchase 
price of $185,000. R. 251 at 30-33 (Ruling of the Court) 
In order to establish the fair market value of the property at the time of sale, the 
Copelands offered the testimony of Randy Day. Randy Day is the Broker and a licensed real 
estate agent for Canyon Country Realty with 15 years of experience. He was defendant's listing 
and sales agent in this particular transaction. Mr. Day had extensive knowledge of the Moab real 
estate market, and intimate knowledge of the market for bed and breakfasts. 
Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides: 
If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert 
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of 
an opinion or otherwise. 
H • specialized knowledge 
was neccssan u*. a>.^>i the * <>>.» »* kutrnune the tan vaint o? UK property, which was the 
critical fact at issue I JUL U> uuineiuiis dch'ir* objections ,11K < mill luiuiini 1li« f "ft(rlaiic1*. lo 
rather extensively establish Mr. Ua>'s knowledge and expedience a-- .x basis for -i ;>pn 
What emerged from the testimony was that Mr. Day was not i -ni> quani sea w ICIKK:-. % -
i>iii 'M ( quite possihh, tlit1 brst witness available for that purpose. 
Defendant attempts to diminish Mr Da\ N testimony with semantics. Randy Day is not a 
pi"i >n - v<«,' • - i • . ^ ometimes i lsed tei i us 
*ike optimum value" - "optimum opinion etc I lowest n*. t. * ne reads his testimom w-. is 
entirety, it is quite clear that he is providing his well-in:* i.nui opimoi " "Ian maiUi V»IM »l 
: -rvny at the time of sale. I 'he specific testimony and argument on this issue found at 
K. 251 at 39-50 was as follows: 
. -. • ' - • • * ' •
 j
 • I . 
Q (Russell) Are you familiar with ihe Moab real estate market? 
* Yes. 
^ You have been involved with it for how long? 
I have been involved in it since 1984 
Q: i: .. imjH-; \itir .. ,A*K some kind of estimate on the value of real estate when you 
are involved, particularly A uh a sale? 
A,,: It ^ v i l a n o . :* 
V- •••'•:• -o )ou, as a practical matter, attempt to make that sort of evaluation on 
property that >ou aie involved in as an agent for the sale? 
A: I do. 
Q: Did you do that with this property? 
A: I suggested what I thought would be an optimum price before we listed but we 
were a little higher than what I thought was an optimum pifice and what we could prove as an 
income property. 
Q: When you talk about optimum price, are you talking about price supported by 
what you know about the market? 
A: By the basic market, yes. 
Q: What was that price? 
Slaugh: Objection due to lack of appraisal. 
Russell: One of the reasons we don't have an - there was supposed to be an appraisal, 
Your Honor, but Mr. Moyle refused to allow it - threatened to have anyone who came onto his 
property to appraise arrested There was supposed to be an appraisal of the property and that's 
the reason we don't have one. And now it's two years later. (See also, Affidavit of Joe 
Kingsley,R. 110-112A) 
(Note: Defense counsel denied any knowledge of this fact (he did not represent the 
defendant at the time). Defendant later testified on direct examination and did not deny or refute 
that he purposefully prevented an appraisal from taking place. It is a fact that he wrongfully 
prevented an appraisal of the property. It is also a fact that defendant has had over two years to 
obtain his own appraisal, but has not done so.) 
Russell: You know, Your Honor, there are appraisals - appraisals have some very unique 
limitations in that, you can talk to an appraiser and they say, "I have to base my appraisal on 
comparables that have happened in the recent past." Sometimes there are no comparables. 
Sometimes the recent past isn't so recent. And sometimes, and especially in a market like this, 
the values of property change dramatically in a very short period of time, and, appraisals are 
good, but 1 think that someone who is a broker, who has been in the business for ten years 
valuing property on behalf of both buyers and sellers continually over that period, there is 
enough foundation there for the Court that he can give you his opinion and the Court can take 
into consideration that it is not an appraisal by a licensed appraiser. But for what it's worth, I 
think in some circumstances, the values placed by agents involved in the transaction would be 
more accurate (than an appraisal). 
m 
Coin t: Well what I think I am going to do i\ allow him In give his opinion hut in >/;> 
point I need more of the reasoning behind the opinion hejun // '.s going fo have any nerMujM\e 
power, 
vc. Did you do an informal market analysis? 
*^ - J always do an informal one so that I can get (he prices close to what •>. * '» 
-. ,. n . ; f**pcrfy fr,r v.-. ffcjt ! ran make a commission, 
Q: )ict •. en io.iK :ii *•:* • . i-Mimercial properties in Moab? 
44-45 A: At the time b&b s wen c\ aian t sta> on me niarKv.. u 'v 
because the market was going ^ f,-"ij T- "-^•1 -'""'v that vu .«,^ ...,.\ 
and those were a commodity. m was on H ose Tree, 
called Rose Tree Lane B&B, and it had sold at $225,000 with some ver\ ma. 100ms i it. u.ai A 
well done S( !he\ were pretty weli the saiv*. as far as I could tell and (Movie) having some 
of the amenities on site, a nice yard, a big lot. n was kind of on a corner but yet n was in a slow 
side of town, there was nothing across the street (but) a big orchard. Take into consideration his 
hot tub and where he was and the length, Canyon Country B&B was the oldest bed and breakfast 
in town . . . 
I took those into consideration and nc nc nis DOCKS una wneie ms v isa accounts 
were and where things were that had been in. and said, "lake these and let's get 
marketed. " And we talked about it as to whciv i.n* v,Fumum, I thought we would end up settling 
VV ei e you fai i liliai vvitl i otl lei bed ai id bi eakfasts n 11\ loab? 
I was. 
Q: With their layout and *\~+h the amenities thev had available9 
A: I used to owi i . . . wnai \\L van v un\oi. * ,u,n- froperty Services and -%c bo<>* , d 
all the B&Bs and we booked extra hotel rooms and stuff. M> wife ran that, so we wsited every 
bed and breakfast in town at some point before that. 
v >n> \\smiKj ii IK win to say iwxu un uiai vAj^nciicc inat you could make an 
objective comparison between the Canyon Country Bed & Breakfast and other bed and 
breakfasts ? 
A: Cei tainly. 
V- Including the Rose Tree that you have already talked about? 
That's correct. . . 
More defense objections 
Russell: I'm ready to give up, Your Honor If we don't have enough foundation now, then 
(we'll) just do something else. 
Court: Well, I'm going to let him testify about his opinion 
Q: What is it? 
A I thought the optimum opinion was around a $250,000 range // was where it 
would come in and then make a fair settlement on the B&Bt and I think that would have been a 
fair price at the time. 
Cross-Examination by Defense Counsel 
Slaugh: What did you mean by a $250,000 range and then make a fair settlement for the 
B&B, can you explain that? 
A Yeah, we were discussing it, (Moyle) and I were discussing it, he said he wanted 
to stay just under $300,000 and that's what we did (the property was listed at $298,000), and I 
said, "Well, we realize that, you know, we are a little high/' he said, "Well, it's easier to come 
down than it is to go up," and I agreed He's the owner so he can set the price anywhere he 
wants, and I told him that I thought the $250,000 would be where we got a fair market value. 
That would be a fair price for the property, (emphasis added) 
Based on the foregoing, this case is easily distinguished from Mallinckrodt v. Salt lake 
County, 983 P2d 566 (Utah 1999), cited in defendant's brief at page 18 In that case, the 
Mallinckrodts' presented an unsigned appraisal purporting to set forth the "current minimum 
market value" of property in a condemnation case The Court rejected the appraisal since 
"neither the Mallickrodts or their appraiser has explained it, (and) it does not appear to be 
equivalent of fair market value " Id. at 569 In this case, as set forth in the testimony, although 
he may have used inartful terms, Randy Day made it very clear that his testimony was intended 
to provide the fair market value of the property and assets as of the relevant valuation date 
Mallinckrodt is further distinguishable by the fact that Salt Lake County provided ample, 
credible evidence regarding the value of the subject property In this case, the defendant 
provided none 
12 
It .* \w\ l i ;- : J K J . S C J C I . I: i i.:. • ' Y 
in a case and the qualifications oi I;K, proposed votne^ Schmdler w Schmdler 77^ P 2d X4 
(Utah CtApp. 1989); Shurtleffv. Jay Tuft & Co., 62,2 P.2d 1,168 (Utah 1980)(rmxham*- lami.. ir 
M ^ •• '?aniir.L' whe the r it wa proper ly 
maintainedi l-ormai uaminu OF educauon ^ not a prerequisite to giving an expert opinion a 
\ \ i - *, - * i - " - • ' w , 
927 P.2d 638 (Utah 1996)(detective allowed to testify as hand-writing expert); Randal; v Ala ;., 
962 T 2d *\lf A u.n i vy3)(police ollicer allowed to testify as accident reconstruction)M ? i^  
reliability . • i ar exnen : opinion is for the trier of feet to determine. Lamb v. Bangert, 525 P.2d 
602 (Utah 1974). In mis case Mf Da\ \s knowledge of and experience with the Moab real estate 
;.ai .jtatL Lioke. j - . : dmr a- J "c i involvement ^ this specific transaction. \MK* 
sufficient to permit the lii:.;iiv i * *.m a adnw; and rely upon ;;, saiuaiior; lesmnony. 
rhe consideration of Randy Day's opinion in tl lis case was definitely not an abuse of 
discretion by the District Court,,, Since it was the only competent evidence offered on the 
\ - all latioi I, issue, the Coi u ( s detei i i lii latic I i of clan jages si IOI 11.cil. be affirmed. 
4 The Valuation Opinion Necessary For This Case Did Not Require 
The Witness to Be a Licensed Real Estate Appraiser 
As established ;ik-\r R<md\ !)HY was probably the most qualified witness to pm\uh •!» 
opinion oi UK: ia. -lu-ukei \aliK ^i Uic subject property in, this ease. Nevertheless u. : u w 
his bi ici, defendant maintains that Day's testimony should have been prohibited by statute 
because he is not a licensed real estate appraiser,, 
Defendant cites no law or precedent to the effect that a Court is strictly limited to licensed 
appraisers as a source for opinions regarding property valuation On the other hand, in C.Y. v. 
State, 962 P 2d 78 (Utah Ct App 1998), this Court approved of the trial court's admission and 
consideration of expert testimony from an unlicensed psychologist In so doing, this Court held 
that licensing, in and of itself, is not dispositive of an expert 9s qualifications to offer an opinion 
in any given area, and, therefore, is not a prerequisite to expert qualification under Rule 702, 
U.RE (emphasis added) 
Defendant's argument is most easily disposed of by the fact that Day did not purport to 
provide an appraisal, nor was one required Under Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence, the 
District Court was well withm its discretion to allow and rely on Day's opinion regarding the 
market value of the property 
Moreover, defendant misconstrues the "Real Estate Appraiser Registration and 
Certification Act," UCA §61-2b-l, et seq Simply stated, the Act is not applicable since Day 
did not provide an appraisal within the meaning of the relevant section of the code Section 61-
2b-3(l) provides that, "It is unlawful for anyone to prepare, for valuable consideration, an 
appraisal " (emphasis added) Since Day received no consideration for his testimony, the 
statute is inapplicable More important, his testimony is covered by a specific exception 
immediately thereafter Section 61 -2b-3(2) provides 
This section does not apply to 
(a) A real estate broker or sales agent licensed by this state who, in the ordinary 
course of his business, gives an opinion 
(I) regarding the value of real estate 
14 
Mr. Day formed his opinion i ^ ^ , - ^ n u\in -..V^L\ property in the ordinary course of 
i ;,, ^ , \ '.*••' J : . hk-ntly competent to form 
such an opinion, and as one ui" ^H\ in\ol\L\i •  -M. Mu- real estate transaction Nothing in the 
Real ksiaie Appraisei Regislialion aim Leiufiiaiion A< i o| \\\\ whav else in Ihr I ifili i mli 
prohibits his providing that opinion in the context of this ca.se, while, on the 01 ha hand, i-
702, I LR.E. specifically allow s the Court to considei Mi Day's opinion 
B. Ihe Courtis Reduction of the Fair Market Value of the Property From 
$250,000 to $235,000 is Not Reversible Error. 
Defendant 1 lamr Ihe ('mill mini'1 Ihil Ihi ' ihit ml (In nrojnh was %?1\S 000 WAS 
unsupported by admissible evidence and was error. Having accepted the credible tc-wnoiv •* 
Randy Day that the fair market value of the property was S2s . • 
defendant to demonstrate that the value was something else. Defendant produced no witness to 
rebut that value, and no evidence whatsoever other than his own testimony 
Defendant. , 1 \ ithoi it offei ing ai n ir 5 •* •• •-*• -• * ^ . t u b u c u 
and breakfast business, non-existent at the time of the sale, was its most important a^set See, 
defendant's 
and breakfast might be an important consideration. / / 154-55, 
Based upon the foregoing, the Coin 11 educes ,; s .ah,, ,ii -;«e property from $250,000 to 
$235,000. The Court stated: 
I stated, I think, early on in this hearing this afternoon that I thought probably the phone 
lines were not included in the language of the contract and candidly I am still not sure about that. 
The Copelands have taken that issue out by conceding that they had no expectation that would be 
included. 
However, I am hard pressed to believe that Mr Movie would have gained anything by 
keeping the number with nothing more than Rockx Mountain Tours with one tour in two 
summers. . . 
However, it is important to the continuity of the business that the existing advertising 
correctly identify the phone number and so I think not having the phone line may and does affect 
the price, the value of the property. Now, I've stated before what it is that was purchased and it's 
what's identified in the agreement. The real estate with the improvements thereon, the right to 
use the name (Canyon Country Bed & Breakfast), that's all identified, the furnishings, 
everything specifically identified as being included. And I fnjd the value of that was $235,000 . . 
I have previously stated that Mr. Moyle was legally obligated to convey that for $185,000 but he 
refused to do so and breached his contract to do so. (R. 251 at 99-100) 
Defendant's appeal of this ruling is curious since the reduction was, if anything, more 
than was warranted under the circumstances. However, it cannot be concluded given the absence 
of any contrary evidence produced by the defendant, that the ruling was clear error or an abuse of 
discretion. Should this Appellate Court be troubled by the reduction, it should affirm the Court's 
conclusion that Randy Day's testimony provided a sufficient basis for a valuation of $250,000, 
and remand solely for a determination of the value of the phone line. This Court need not 
remand the case on that issue however, the plaintiffs are willing to accept the reduction and 
request that the District Court's Judgment be affirmed as is. 
V. The Court's Award of Attorneys' Fees in Connection With 
Defendant's Default Judgment Was Proper. 
Defendant next appeals the District Court's award of attorneys' fees, dated January 7, 
1998. R. 143, 147A, (Defendant's Appendix "B") This was the first of several awards of 
attorneys' fees against defendant in the consolidated actions, and came after an Order setting 
aside a Default Judgment that had previously been entered against the defendant. 
Even though the Court gave the defendant a substantial break by setting aside the Default 
Judgment, it was nevertheless well within the Court's discretion to determine that the plaintiffs 
had incurred the attorneys' fees and costs in an action to enforce the Real Estate Purchase 
Contract as specifically provided in paragraph 17.1 of the contract. R. 13A; See also, Amended 
Affidavit Regarding Attorneys' Fees at R. 123-26A. 
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The Real Estate Contract provides thai hi Hie even* of iiiiu;r" - to enforce this 
contract, the prevailing pai ty shall to costs .:; - reasonable aityii:- . \.v* ." 
I he award of fees was entirely proper when entered, and would have become recoverable 
in any event upon, the eventual grant of the Copelands' Motion, for Summary Judgment by tl ic 
Distri :t Coi n t. 
VI Defendant is Correct Regarding the Interest Rate on Judgments 
Defendant is coneci u.n* . : - interest rate on .-iu:: ::.•. • . . i • • <». 
the statutory rate, liowevei, ai cadi calendar year end. ihc Judgment mu^i be increased by the 
amount of interest earned the previous vear under the prior rate In affirming the Judgments of 
"i K< : t -. . .-* • •• -vi:^. r.is be determined 
accoruimzlv 
Note Re: Plaintiffs1 Appendix: 
i he Appendix ;N^U1CU IK u.e Appellant contains most o* uu loeuments necessary for 
this Courts decision and all of the relevant Court rulings. As a Supplemental Appendix foi the 
convenience of the Court, plaintiffs have included the following; 
1. Affic h\ 'it i if J< X :Kingsl< :y. d; itt M: 1 \,i igu< f )!| >' 1:< 11} I !: 11 tl 112 \ 
2. Affida\ n o: Kand\ Daw dated January Ml I9v(\ R. 44-46B 
3. Ar •:-..' - Kand\ u^>. aaieu i enruarv ~v 
4. Affidavit of George Copeland, dated February 23, 1998. R-183-84A 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant Moyle's acceptance of the Copelands' real estate purchase offer created a 
valid and binding contract for the sale of the subject property When the offer was accepted, the 
real estate plaintiffs, Coldwell Banker/Arches Realty and Canyon Country Realty became 
entitled to a sales commission of $11,100 pursuant to the Listing Agreement executed by the 
defendant That Judgment, R. 102B (Defendant's Appendix "D'), and the award of $3,570 05 in 
fees and costs, R 126B (Defendant's Appendix "G"), as provided for m the listing agreement, 
should be affirmed 
Defendant intentionally breached the Real Estate Sales Contract and the Copelands are 
entitled to the benefit of the bargain measure of damages The Court, in the proper exercise of its 
discretion and as authonzed by Rule 702, U.RE, considered testimony from Randy Day as to 
the fair market value of the real estate as of the date of the transaction Defendant offered no 
competent evidence on the issue The Court's award of $50,000 in damages to the Copelands 
was not error The Judgment for $50,000 and award of attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to the 
real estate sales contract, R. 234A and R. 204A (Defendant's Appendix "F" & T'), should be 
affirmed, as well as an earlier award of costs and fees at R. 147A (Defendant's Appendix 6fcB") 
All affirmed Judgments should continue to accrue interest at the proper legal rate until 
paid The plaintiffs should be awarded their costs, including attorneys' fees (pursuant to the Real 
Estate Contract and Listing Agreement) m connection with this appeal 
Dated this Jj^_ day of Pffenbi/^ , 1999 
5% 
Steve Russell 
Attorney for the Plaintiffs - Appellees 
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Appendix "1" 
Affidavit of Joe Kingsley, dated August 20,1997, 
R.1HM12A 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOE KINGSLEY 
State of Utah ) 
) ss. 
Grand County ) 
JOE KINGSLEY, being first duly sworn, deposes and states 
that: 
1. I am over 21 years of age and make this Affidavit 
based upon personal knowledge. 
2. I am the owner of Coldwell Banker/Arches Realty 
in Moab, Utah. 
3. I am personally familiar with the subject bed & 
breakfast property at 590 North 500 West in Moab, and with the 
sales transaction between Nelson Moyle as Seller and George & 
Sharon Copeland, as Buyers. 
4. Coldwell Banker/Arches Realty represented the 
Buyers in that transaction. 
5. I am also personally familiar with the various bed 
and breakfast businesses in the Moab area and have owned and 
operated a bed and breakfast myself. 
6. I have been involved in the valuation of property 
and businesses, including bed and breakfast properties for over 30 
years. 
7. In January, 1997, at the time of the sale from 
Moyle to the Copelands the Canyon Country Bed & Breakfast was a 
well maintained and attractive property, being actively operated as a 
bed and breakfast, and presented a viable and valuable property as 
well as business opportunity. 
8. The property was actively marketed and 
specifically sold by Mr. Moyle as a bed and breakfast business, and 
was to come complete with all business assets, books, records, 
accounts, and existing deposits and reservations. 
9. After Mr. Moyle backed out of the completed sales 
transaction, he thereafter refused access to the property to the 
Copelands and my office as their agents. 
10. On August 14, 1997, I and other agents from my 
office were allowed access to the property for the first time since the 
date of the sales transaction. 
11. Our inspection on that date revealed the following: 
a. The premises was filthy and appeared not to 
have been maintained for several months at least; 
b. The linoleum on in the kitchen must be 
completely replaced. 
c Several of the swamp coolers have leaked 
causing serious damage and staining to the ceilings and walls in 
several rooms. 
& The outside of the house must be repainted 
and refinished. 
e. The grounds have been completely neglected, 
apparently for the entire year. Trees have died. 
f. Many other small defects and damages which 
would need to be repaired in order to use the premises as a bed and 
breakfast business. 
12. I estimate that it would cost at least $10,000 in 
maintenance and repairs to get the property back into a condition 
where it would be viable as a bed and breakfast. 
13. In addition, Mr. Moyle has completely abandoned 
the bed and breakfast business, and in fact has allowed his business 
license to lapse. 
14. It is my understanding that the premises currently 
has no business, no deposits, no reservations and no prospects for 
any. 
15. Based upon my knowledge and experience in the 
bed and breakfast business, I estimate that it would take at least one 
year, and probably closer to two years to re-establish the premises 
as a viable and profitable bed and breakfast. 
Dated this df^ day of (\)MX9t , 1997. 
Notary's Verification 
On the 2 2 t day of jQt^ L2SE_ , 1997, personally appeared 
before me JOE KINGSLEY who stated that he had read the foregoing 
AFFIDAVIT and that the statements were true and complete to the 
best of his knowledge, information and belief. Joe Kingsley signed 
the Affidavit in my presence. 
SmmaJjMAMn 
Notary Public 
S e a l :
 I $%£& SOMMAR L JOHNSON . 
' f t r a S 1660 Kafina Heights I 
I XSSx Moab, Utah 84532 • 
Appendix "2" 
Affidavit of Randy Day, dated January 30,1998. 
R. 44-46B 
AFFIDAVIT OF RANDY DAY 
State of Utah ) 
)ss. 
Grand County 
RANDY DAY, being first duly sworn, deposes and states 
that: 
1. The following Affidavit is based upon personal knowledge. 
2. I am principal Broker and a real estate agent for Canyon 
Country Realty in Moab, Utah. 
3. Canyon County Realty is a plaintiff in the matter entitled 
Canyon Country Realty, et al v. Moyle, Civil No. 9707-96. 
4. On September 12, 1996,1 entered into a Listing Agreement 
for property at 590 North 500 West in Moab, Utah, known as the Canyon 
Country Bed & Breakfast. The property was listed and actively marketed as an 
existing and operating bed and breakfast business. 
5. On January 7,1997,1 received a written Real Estate Purchase 
Offer from George & Sharon Copeland on the property from their agents at 
Coldwell Banker/Arches Realty. 
6. I could not find Nelson Moyle for several days. I finally 
tracked him down at a Motel 6 training in Texas. 
7. On the morning of January 13,1997,1 spoke with Mr. Moyle 
on the telephone, the essence of the conversation being as follows: 
Day: We have received a written purchase offer on the Bed & 
Breakfast. 
Moyle: How much is the offer. 
Day: $185,000. 
Moyle: Great. I can do that. FAX it to me. 
8. I immediately FAX'd the written offer to Moyle at the 
number he provided. 
9. Within an hour, Moyle FAX'd his acceptance of the offer 
back to me. 
10. Moyle initialed and dated every page of the document, and 
inserted himself as co-listing agent on page 2. On page 1, Moyle listed a few 
items of personal property under §1.2 Excluded Items, See, Exhibit 1. 
11. I had previously been aware that Moyle was a licensed real 
estate agent. 
12. On page 6 of the Real Estate Purchase Contract, Moyle 
checked the box: ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE: Seller 
Accepts the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions specified above. 
13. Moyle then signed the document in the space entitled Seller's 
Signature, and dated it 1/13/97 at 10:30 a.m. 
14. Upon receipt of the FAX'd acceptance, I immediately 
contacted the Buyer's agent Kelly Stelter and informed him the offer had been 
accepted. 
15. I subsequently FAX'd and /o r delivered a copy of the 
accepted offer to Mr. Stelter's Office early in the afternoon of January 13,1997. 
16. I was subsequently informed that the Copelands had 
reviewed the accepted offer with their agent and were in full agreement. 
17. Still later in the day, I was informed that Mr. Moyle wanted 
to rescind the contract. 
18- I had another conversation with Mr. Moyle (paraphrasing) 
as follows: 
Day: We have an accepted offer, it's too late to rescind it. 
Moyle: 111 send a counter-offer. 
Day: You're and agent. Yoi know the rules. You can't 
counter an accepted offer. 
Moyle: Well, I'm getting out of this. Ill get an attorney and 
well get out of it. 
19. My office FAX'd Mr. Moyle an addendum form at his 
request 
20. On January 13,1997, my Office received via FAX a document 
entitled Addendum No. 1 to Real Estate Purchase Contract, stating "Sales Price to 
Be $255,000." The document is signed by Mr. Moyle and was FAX'd from his 
location in Texas at 6:38 p.m. See, Exhibit 2. 
21. I personally received the FAX the next morning and in turn 
FAX'd it to the Copelands' agent Kelly Stelter on January 14,1997. 
22. Based on my knowledge, training and experience as a Broker 
and real estate agent, Mr. Moyle's acceptance of the written offer constituted a 
valid and binding contract as soon as said acceptance was communicated to the 
Buyer's Agent 
23. Based on my knowledge, training and experience as a Broker 
and real estate agent, Mr. Moyle attempt to submit a rescission or counter-offer 
after acceptance of the offer was invalid and of no effect, and I so informed him 
at the time. 
Dated this 50_ day of Jkorv^ « , 1998. 
Randy Day / y ^ 
Notary's Verification 
On the 3 D day of 'SJh f\ )AQ >r\/ 1998, personally appeared before 
me, RANDY DAY, who said that the statements in the foregoing AFFIDAVIT 
were true to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, and who also 
signed the Affidavit in my presence. 
±Mn^ vv\aw lovmon 
Notary Public 
Notary Public Hi 
Seal: { 0%5%£k "AiL MARIE BROWN . 
•'••>«*:. UUtt &4:„}> 
t* >< Cv'.uir,-saioi * Fxp.; e - | 
^ ''
!<t/24.200G 
— —. ™ State of Uuth I 
*"**• " • • * • * « • * ~ ~ M M * 
Appendix "3" 
Affidavit of Randy Day, dated February 23,1998. 
R. 185-86A 
AFFIDAVIT OF RANDY DAY 
State of Utah ) 
) ss. 
Grand County 
RANDY DAY, being first duly sworn, deposes and states 
that: 
1. The following Affidavit is based upon personal knowledge. 
2. I am principal Broker and a real estate agent for Canyon Country 
Realty in Moab, Utah. 
3. Canyon County Realty is a plaintiff in the matter entitled Canyon 
Country Realty, et a\. v. Moyle, Civil No. 9707-96. 
4. I have been a licensed real estate agent in Utah for 15 years. I have 
been a licensed real estate broker in Utah for 10 years. 
5. I was the agent for Nelson Moyle in his listing for sale of the 
Canyon Country Bed & Breakfast. 
6. On January 7, 1997, I received a written Real Estate Purchase 
Contract on the property with George & Sharon Copeland as 
Buyers through their agent Kelly Stelter. 
7. I communicated the offer to Nelson Moyle on January 13,1997. He 
accepted the offer both orally to me and in writing via FAX. 
8. The acceptance included insignificant exclusions of Moyle's 
personal property which were not a part of the Copelands' offer. 
9. Later in the afternoon of January 13, 1997, and before any 
indication or receipt of Moyle's "Addendum" setting a higher 
purchase price, I received notice from the Buyers' agent Kelly 
Stelter that the contract revisions had been reviewed and accepted 
by the Copelands. 
10. Based on my professional experience and training, the Copelands' 
offer was accepted, final and binding when Moyle checked the box 
on the contract entitled ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER TO 
PURCHASE. See, my prior Affidavit dated January 30,1998. 
11. Based on my professional experience and training, the exclusion of 
personal property not included in the Buyers' offer does not 
constitute a counteroffer. 
12. Based on my professional experience and training, Moyle's 
"Addendum No. 1" to the Real Estate Purchase Contract does not 
constitute a counteroffer and is invalid. 
13. Based on my professional experience and training, no response 
from the Buyers to Moyle's Addendum No. 1 was necessary, nor 
did the failure to provide a written response to the Addendum 
have any effect on the previously accepted offer. 
Dated this IA day of F^sS- , 1998. 
Randy Day 
Notary's Verification 
On the^?9 aay of ^JOy-u/CM u , - 1998, personally appeared before 
me, RANDY DAY, who said that the statements in the foregoing AFFIDAVIT 
were true to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, and who also 
signed the Affidavit in my presence. 
Notary Public 
' <CI<>\ Noiury PutAiL ~1 
Seal: * ,<?<W\\ UAIl MARIE BHuWN . 
* um^wj -^ uidf o4o u 
Appendix "4" 
Affidavit of George Copeland, dated February 23,1998, 
R. 183-84A 
AFFIDAVIT OF GEORGE COPELAND 
State of Utah ) 
) ss. 
Grand County ) 
GEORGE COPELAND, being,first duly sworn, deposes 
and states that: 
1. The following Affidavit is based upon personal knowledge. 
2. I am a plaintiff in the matter entitled Copeland v. Moyle, Civil No. 
9707-77. 
3. Prior to submitting the Real Estate Purchase Contract dated 
January 7,1997,1 had only a very short opportunity to look at the property - no 
more than half an hour at most. My wife did not see the property at all. 
4. Prior to making the purchase offer, we had no contact with Nelson 
Moyle whatsoever. 
5. Everything we intended to be included in the purchase offer is set 
forth in Section 1.1 of the Real Estate Purchase Contract. In addition to the 
standard fixtures included in the contract we added, all furnishings except 
dining table; the guest book; water rights & pumps and a fifth wheel trailer that 
was on the property. 
6. In Section 1.2 of the contract we excluded the dining room table 
and some ski boots based on information from our agent Kelly Stelter. I had 
seen the table, but had no knowledge about ski boots and did not care about 
them. 
7. At no time were we aware of any personal property of Nelson 
Moyle's on the premises, nor did we have any expectation that anything other 
than the items specified in the Purchase Offer were included in the contract. 
8. Specifically, we had no knowledge of the items of personal 
property inserted by Moyle on January 13, 1997 in Section 1.2 of the 
Contract, nor were those items included in our Purchase Offer. 
9. Consequently, on bemg made aware that Moyle had listed 
items of personal property under the exclusions section of the 
contract, we immediately and unequivocally approved. 
Dated this £ ^ ' d a y of A ^ V ^ / ^ / , 1998. 
Geojrge Copeland 
Notaryfs Verification 
On the (2L?> day of h6WUflfc-H , 1998, personally appeared before 
me, GEORGE COPELAND, who said that the statements in the foregoing 
AFFIDAVIT were true to the best of his knowledge, information and beHef, and 
who also signed the Affidavit in my presence. 
vvCsiRfiJ 1660 Kahna Hc 9hts • Notary Public 
I \ 2 S ^ M o a b»U l a h 8 4 5 3 2 I 
1
 My CoamkMKM Expires Mat 01 ,1999 * 
